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Document No. <u>054</u>
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S G
Auth: HM 70-2
Date: <u>10 JUL 1978</u> By: <input type="checkbox"/>

OFFICE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1000 Hr 25 April 1953

COMMENTS ON THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL OF 25 APRIL

First impressions of the Pravda editorial in the order in which they were generated by the text:

1. The idea of "collective" leadership is again publicly espoused. Malenkov, Beria and Molotov are cited as expressing the will of the Soviet people for peace. Statements such as "in the opinion of the Soviet leaders" are found in the text. No reference is made to Stalin. This continues the prior pattern of deemphasizing him.

2. The President is accused of threatening atomic war. This appears to be an obvious effort to make propaganda capital. Several statements are made to the effect that the USSR, while willing to negotiate, will not be doing so as a result of these threats.

3. The problems touched by the President are said to be not all of equal importance. This too is an obvious point but suggests that some of them can be settled with no strain on the Soviet Union, possibly Austria. Several references are made to "problems ripe for solution." (Although no specific problems are named.)

4. The treatment of Korea is standard and as such in the context of current events may be construed as somewhat unusual, i.e. not really suggestive of a solution to the POW repatriation problem.

5. There appears to be no change in the Soviet position on Germany.

6. Much attention is paid to the President's omission of any remarks on Communist China and Taiwan.

7. The President's remarks on the Eastern European satellites are summarily treated. The USSR rejected the notion that it should assist in re-establishing already overthrown reactionary regimes.

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8. The USSR would be going against the course of history if it attempted to retard the colonial liberation movement. This appears to mean that the USSR is not anxious to call a halt to the Indochinese war.

9. The Austrian problem is left dangling but the impression is given that a solution here is possible.

10. The normal stress is given to the question of China's admission to the UN.

11. The President's fund is treated almost as a reality rather than as a possible distant vista suggesting a defensive attitude toward this subject. It is, however, disposed of propagandistically as a continuation of the imperialistic pattern set by the Marshal Plan and Point IV aid.

12. Treatment of Secretary Dulles' follow-up speech is rather harsh. It is implied that if there is no back-tracking on EDC then there will be no settlements.

13. The USSR implies that it will not accept new wine in old bottles, the US has to "give" a little more.

14. The USSR has apparently not adopted a new position of disarmament though its remarks on this question are unclear.

15. The President's appeal to the new leadership of the Soviet Union to adopt a different policy is sidestepped by the Soviet "leaders," who ask that the new leadership of the US adopt a policy different from that of the preceding administration.

16. There is renewed emphasis on the UN suggesting that if direct negotiations are unsatisfactory to the USSR it will pursue its policies in the UN.

The general impression is that, apart from being a long and somewhat unique reply, there is nothing new in the Pravda editorial. It appears to be a clever, somewhat defensive repudiation, probably hashed out in combined session by the Soviet leaders. It does not contain any of the startling proposals that the West was supposedly worried about. It suggests that no problem, except possibly Austria, can be solved unless the US abandons its previous positions. No one Soviet leader gets the credit or discredit for making the reply. It, in effect, cautiously passes the buck back to President Eisenhower and, although making no mention of the Stalin regime, does not

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abandon any of its positions. In effect, it appears to be an effort to give a reply to the President which does not jeopardize the Soviet position or freedom of maneuver but at the same time does not preclude future negotiations and possible settlements.

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Class. Changed To: TS S C
Auth: SLS 70-2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
27 April 1953

PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE PRAVDA REPLY TO
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS

Soviet Orbit Reaction

IZVESTIA, the Soviet Government newspaper, followed up the PRAVDA article of 25 April with a statement that Russia's main objective is to "prevent another war and to live in peace with all countries." A Moscow radio broadcast quoted the IZVESTIA article to the effect that the USSR is guided by "Leninist-Stalinist principles regarding the possibility of a prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition between the capitalist and socialist systems."

Both the PRAVDA editorial and the President's speech were published in full in TRUD, RED STAR, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and other Soviet newspapers. Moscow radio broadcast the editorial widely in most foreign languages and repeatedly in English, German and French.

The Warsaw press front-paged the full text of the PRAVDA article. The Hungarian press carried the entire editorial plus a summary of the President's address. All Czech papers published the text of the PRAVDA editorial, and the Communist Party paper carried a full translation of the President's speech. The Vienna Communist press featured the full text of the PRAVDA editorial. In a short comment the Communist VOLKSSTIMME referred to the "quiet and objective" tone of the article which made it an "example of how to conduct an international debate to promote understanding."

Satellite radio treatment of the PRAVDA editorial has been extensive. The Warsaw radio first broadcast a lengthy summary without comment and later cancelled a regularly scheduled program to broadcast the full text. The complete editorial was broadcast also in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Albania and East Germany broadcast a summary and extracts.

Non-Orbit Reaction

Italy - Italian press reaction to the PRAVDA editorial is generally cautious, with few expressions of optimism. IL POPOLO, of Milan, notes that "fears of a new and more subtle

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cold war are not dispelled. In this case, an even greater danger than before threatens Europe." The Rome independent paper IL MESSAGGERO states that "the Soviet reply to Eisenhower does not justify excessive optimism. On the contrary, it shows that it is more necessary than ever for the European countries to remain united and to continue with their defense organization." IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, a Milan independent paper, describes the Soviet aim as one of "creating uncertainty and doubt and giving rise to vague hopes in the Western world."

Premier De Gasperi in a campaign speech challenged Russia to prove her good will by accepting a 1948 proposal to return all of Trieste to Italy.

Western Germany - Bonn Government circles were reportedly critical of the PRAVDA reply on the grounds that it did "not contain anything positive." The only concrete point raised was "the negative factor of Potsdam." The conclusion is that the "Soviet reactions to the Eisenhower speech show even more urgently the need to obtain results on the road followed by the West."

Austria - The non-Communist Austrian press unanimously pointed out that PRAVDA, while polite in tone, basically rejected the President's terms for peace and offered no practical proposals for an East-West rapprochement. No particular emphasis was placed on PRAVDA's reference to an Austrian treaty, which was described as "only a vague remark."

One paper, however, stated that PRAVDA has possibly "strengthened the hopes of the Austrian people for a state treaty" and argued that Russia considered the Austrian treaty issue "the least difficult of any of the pending international questions."

Turkey - Radio ANKARA carried a point-by-point analysis of the PRAVDA editorial, emphasizing that Moscow merely repeated its old contentions. The broadcast was especially critical of the Soviet stand on Germany and Eastern Europe, and said that the treatment of China showed that "the Soviet political outlook must be still governed by propaganda considerations and does not seem likely to change." The broadcast concluded that Moscow seems to expect an invitation to hold a conference. The Kremlin's answer to the President demonstrated, however,

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"that such a conference is doomed to remain abortive."

India - Three leading Bombay newspapers commented favorably on the PRAVDA editorial. The consensus was that the Malenkov regime had displayed a desire for world peace and that the Western powers must be willing to "pay some price" to secure it. One paper said, "Eisenhower was imaginative in his bid for world peace, but he made the mistake of demanding a high price from Russia without offering any compensating concessions." PRAVDA's reference to the place of Communist China in the international scene was said to be "an extremely relevant one."

Western diplomats in Moscow - Some Western diplomats in Moscow were reported to believe that the PRAVDA editorial was aimed to appeal more to British and French opinion than to American.

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PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT
ON THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL

World reaction to the White House statement on the PRAVDA editorial is meager thus far. An independent Bombay newspaper, however, pointed out that "If the present Soviet policy continues for some time, it will be extremely difficult for the United States to persist in her negative attitude, and the White House statement bears witness to this fact." The paper continued that "John Foster Dulles appears to be out of step with the White House in saying, as he is believed to have done at Paris, that a meeting with Russia is out of the question."

Document No. 036

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Class. Change To: TS S C

Auth: 10 JUL 1978

Date: 10 JUL 1978 By:

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